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PUBLIC LAW
not be annulled on the ground of his discharge in bankruptcy,
and the creditor claimed that its judgment was within Section
17a(2), hence was not discharged. The Supreme Court believ-
ing that the court of appeal had insufficient evidence in the rec-
ord to make its findings, remanded to the trial court for further
proof on the issue of fraud. In League Central Credit Union v.
Warman,1 4 where judgment was obtained a few days before de-
fendant got his discharge in bankruptcy (no stay having been
applied for in the bankruptcy court), defendant sought to enjoin
enforcement of the judgment, and it was held that a prelimi-
nary injunction would issue as the order of discharge made out
at least a prima facie case.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Joseph Dainow*
The amount of international activity in Louisiana is not re-
flected in litigation before the Louisiana courts. Fortunately so.
It may be presumed that many international differences and
disputes are settled amicably on the advice of counsel for both
sides and in accordance with international law, or else they are
directed into diplomatic channels for settlement at the govern-
mental level. Accordingly, the case of Republic of Cuba v.
Mayan Lines, S.A.' is one of the infrequent instances of such
judicial determination in Louisiana.
In a prior suit by the Mayan Lines against the Republic of
Cuba, with attachment of Cuban property in Louisiana, the plea
of sovereign immunity had been withdrawn and a judgment
was rendered in accordance with a settlement agreement reached
by the parties. The present action was instituted by the Re-
public of Cuba, through a duly authorized local attorney, seek-
ing to annul the money judgment of the prior suit by reason of
alleged error, fraud, and ill practice. The lower court dismissed
this action on the grounds of lack of procedural capacity because
after the break in diplomatic relations between the United
States and Cuba the Republic of Cuba had designated the Gov-
14. 143 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 145 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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ernment of Czechoslovakia as its representative in the United
States.
In reversing the decision on the exception of lack of pro-
cedural capacity, the court of appeal properly pointed out the
distinction between the continuity of "diplomatic relations" and
the continuity of "recognition." The break in diplomatic rela-
tions did not change the status of Cuba as a "recognized" state
and therefore it was entitled under international law and under
American law to institute suit in its own name in American
state or federal courts.
In the course of its opinion, the court of appeal stated that
"once granted, recognition of foreign sovereignty continues until
such time as such recognition is expressly withdrawn or can-
celled by the appropriate political department of the government
concerned."'2 The immediate purpose of this statement placed
the emphasis on the point that the judiciary must act in accord-
ance with the position taken by the political department on the
matter of recognition. However, the statement as made could
leave the impression that withdrawal or cancellation of recog-
nition of a state is as common a practice as breaking of diplo-
matic relations.
In international law, the recognition of a sovereign state is
generally irrevocable.8 A distinction must be made between the
recognition of a state and the recognition of the government
of a state. When there is a change of government within a state,
other states may choose among a number of alternative posi-
tions. They may recognize the new government and continue
the course of previous diplomatic relations; they may not recog-
nize the new government and continue to recognize the diplo-
matic representatives of the former government as the con-
tinuing representatives of the foreign state ;4 or there may be
an announcement that as of a certain date the recognition of
a former government would terminate and at the same time
recognition of the new government would commence. 5
2. Id. at 683.
3. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (3d ed 1939). Inter-
American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 1933, art. 6:
"Recognition of a state . . . is unconditional and irrevocable." 49 Stat. 3097, 3100
(1933). Sixteen states are parties to this convention, including United States
and Cuba.
4. E.g., between 1918 and 1933, U.S.A. accepted as representatives of Russia
the emissaries of the former regime until recognition of the Soviet government.
5. E.g., Great Britain's action in recognizing a new Polish government after
there had been a Polish government in exile during World War II.
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In all of these variations with reference to recognition of
new governments, there is never any question about the con-
tinuing and irrevocable recognition of the foreign state.
A new government which has not been recognized does not
have a right to institute suit in an American court, but the
Castro government had been recognized by the United States
and this is not affected by a break in diplomatic relations.
Thus there are three separate concepts which are distinct
from each other: (1) the recognition of a new state, (2) the
recognition of a new government in an existing state, and (3)
the maintenance of diplomatic relations with the recognized
government of a recognized state.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahon*
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
This area of the subject, which usually yields a bountiful
harvest of litigated cases, produced but a single case in the ap-
pellate courts during the past term, but this settled an extremely
important point. Foti v. Monterol answered the question of
whether, in municipalities having the commission form of gov-
ernment, the employees of each municipal department were to be
appointed by the commissioner in charge of the department or
by the commission council itself. The action was brought by the
mayor and commissioner of public health and safety of the City
of Donaldsonville to restrain the enforcement of two ordinances
adopted by the majority of the members of the commission coun-
cil. The first ordinance declared that the council itself had the
power to determine the positions to be filled in each department.
The second declared that the council itself had the power to ap-
point and remove all emp]oyees of the city. On the date on which
these ordinances were adopted, the council adopted a resolution
designating the positions to be filled, appointing and assigning
individuals to these positions, and fixing the compensation to be
6. R.S.F.S.R. v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255 (1923).
*Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 243 La. 734, 146 So. 2d 789 (1962).
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